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Abstract
There have been several efforts to build life-like autonomous creatures in virtual worlds, but
only few of them have focused their intentions in presenting human-like autonomous creatures.
In this paper we discuss the problem of building autonomous virtual humanoids with goal di-
rected behaviors. We present the decision-making as a process compound of: goal achievement
planning, dynamic belief management, evolving goals, internal states and confidence levels. As
simulating real humans, we applied to our model theories of Humans’ Trust to be able to interact
with the virtual humanoids and direct them at real time.
Keywords. Agent-oriented approach, goal achievement, dynamic beliefs, decision-making,
planning, trust, confidence.
1 Introduction
Virtual environments are becoming more impor-
tant every day especially in educational and enter-
tainment programs. With this evolution, the user
gets more demanding, and the realism of this world
is a key point. Users want to control and interact
with virtual environments in real time, they want
to be immersed in these new worlds. One im-
portant contribution to the environment’s realism
is the human like performance of the humanoids
who inhabits those environments. These require-
ments are the motivation for this work, we endow
the virtual humanoids with a reasoning layer al-
lowing them to take their own decisions, to have
goal-directed behaviors, to act based on emotional
levels and to take advantage of opportunistic situ-
ations in dynamic environments.
There have been few developed system where
the character behaves in an intelligent and goal-
directed way. Improv, (Perlin and Goldberg [7])
is a tool to create actors that respond to users and
to each other. This system is completely prepro-
grammed, and during the simulation actors just
follows some scripts, even time between actions
are also predefined. This scripted system is very
rigid to be able to adapt to changing environments
and the definition of actors’ actions is made at a
very low level (in term of degree of freedom).
Blumberg in [3] showed an interesting archi-
tecture to design characters in interactive virtual
environments with competent autonomous actions
and capable of responding to an external control.
In this case, this architecture is more oriented to
animal-like simulation, where the dog Silas was
one of the applications of the system.
Some works have got closer to human-like char-
acters as the one presented in: Cosmos by Lester
et al [5], the PPP person explained by Elisabeth
Andre´ [1], and Steve by Rickel and Johnson [9].
However these characters have very different goals:
they are pedagogical agents in charge of providing
advice and explanations to the attendants.
The work presented by Bates in his TOK archi-
tecture [2] is very interesting. The architecture is
composed of Hap that is in charge of reactivity and
goal directed behaviors and Em in charge of emo-
tions and social relationship. The problem in this
system is that the Em module only receives the ac-
tion selected by Hap, this means that the emotions
don’t take part of the decision making process.
Also, their agents don’t have emotional reactions
to objects that they are not currently sensing.
The second topic of this paper is the directabil-
ity of these characters. When we talk about vir-
tual humanoids and user interactions, it is worth
mentioning the controllability that the user has on
these humanoids. Moreover if we talk about agency,
we should talk about autonomy, but how can we
bind virtual humanoids and agency without loos-
ing the desired controllability of the first one and
the autonomy of the second one? We propose a
controllability model based on human trust theo-
ries.
There have been some works in this area, for
example in the controlling approach for Improv
[7], the user has direct control through actor’s mo-
tor skills. Also in Silas (Blumberg [3]) the control
is made accessing internal variables of the agent
which represent motivations and goals, for exam-
ple increasing the hunger level ensure that Silas
will eat. Badler and Zeltzer have proposed similar
decomposition of control. In these approaches, ac-
tors are unaware of changes and they can not learn
from experience.
In this paper we present some contributions to
the creation of virtual creatures:
 We focused on simulating humans-like char-
acters, where special attention is paid to trust
models, beliefs about other agents and inter-
nal states.
 The process of action-selections is a process
which integrate goal achievements efforts, dy-
namic belief manipulation, internal states rates
and beliefs about other agents.
 The model we introduce to control the agent
looks forward to achieve a closer human-like
feeling of the virtual humanoids. This model
allows the agent to be aware of the changes
he is accepting, and allow him to learn from
them.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In
the second section, a description of the Intelligent
Virtual Agent is given. The third section presents
the trust model applied to the virtual humanoid to
be able to control it. The fourth section presents
in depth explanations of the system’s intelligent
module called IntelMod. The fifth section briefly
describes a concrete example. Finally we end our
exposition with a conclusion of the current work
and we present some future extensions.
2 The Intelligent Virtual Agent
To obtain human-like virtual humanoids, we have
modelled a reasoning unit called “Intelligent Vir-
tual Agent” (IVA). This unit will be plugged as a
“brain” to the virtual humans.
IVAs are based on a BDI architecture (Beliefs,
desires and intentions), widely described in [8].
This architecture is promising but needs some ex-
tensions for achieving our goal: giving to the vir-
tual humanoid the ability to act by himself in a
dynamic environment relying on his beliefs, inter-
nal states, current state of the surrounded world
and the assumption about other agents. It should
also allow us to control it in real time. The main
additions we have done are:
 Categorize the beliefs, in order to be able to
simulate a simple framework of short term
memory and long term memory.
 Inclusion of internal states for the agents in
order to simulate basic emotions and mental
states like fear, shyness, courage and happi-
ness.
 Reliability on trust. Agents should trust to
each other, and this reliance will evolve over
time. In our model each agent stores some be-
liefs about other agents. These beliefs are the
bases for collaborative work based on trust.
 Inclusion of emotions in the plan’s structure
and in the evaluation plans.
Before going any father lets put a scenario as
example, the LIG’s lounge (see Figure 12), where
agents can go to have a drink, to dance, to meet
other agents o just to have a look for a while. Claire
who has to decide what to do at any given time
of the simulation inhabits the scenario. Claire in
this case is one IVA and she has all her knowledge
Statics
Dynamic
Tiredness 0 100 80 DSC
Anxiety 0 100 30 DSC
Emotional states
Claire
LIG’s_Lab
Beliefs
get the diskette
ask someone
turn-on light
Secondary goals
information
turn-off light
Plans to steal something
Plans to have a rest
Plans for hobbies
Set of plans
Steal LIG’s
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I don’t know where 
I’m in LIG area
I’m a stealer
I’m a woman
Goal
John is my friend
Beliefs about others
Figure 1: The intelligent virtual agent IVA.
organized in sets, as shown in Figure 1, which
are distributed according to their functionality: set
of Beliefs, set of Goals, set of Competing Plans,
set of Internal states, set of Beliefs About Other.
Based on all his knowledge, the IVA is able to
select the correct action to perform, in order to
achieve its goal. This process is done by the Be-
havioral Engine which will be explained later in
this paper. Figure 2 shows the initial definition of
Claire’s knowledge.
(plans *P_Stealer*, *P_Walker*)
(longTermBeliefs ’((I’m a stealer)
(shortTermBeliefs ’((I don’t know where to find the information)
)
empty-list)))
((I’m in LIG’s area))))
((I’m a woman)
(secondaryGorals nil)
((name Claire)
(environment LIG’s_Lab)
(internalStates ’((tiredness 0 100 80 DSC)
(anxiety 0 100 30 DSC)
(curiosity 0 100 60 -)))
(assumptionsAboutOther ’((john friend)))
(mainGoal ’steal LIG’s information)
Figure 2: Agent specification.
2.1 Beliefs
Beliefs represent the knowledge of the IVA, These
are a set of statements that the IVA believes to be
true. The agent’s beliefs are organized in two cat-
egories:
Long term beliefs (LTB) are beliefs that will not
change during the entire simulation. These
beliefs build up the everlasting memories of
the agent. i.e.. I’m a woman
Short term beliefs (STB) are beliefs that may cha-
nge. During the simulation some of these be-
liefs will be removed and some will be added,
i.e. At the beginning when Claire arrives to
the LIG’s Lounge she has a believe: I have
not danced yet, but when she dance, this state-
ment will be converted into I have danced.
The IVA remembers things for a given period
of time. Adding an expiration period of time
to each of the short term belief simulates this.
Short term beliefs are forgotten when the time
is over.
The belief’s semantic is a positive close world,
this means that if something is not specified inside
the agent’s beliefs is consider to be false. i.e. If
we want to search into Claire’s memories to see if
she has been in the bar before, we look for (I have
been in the bar) inside her beliefs. If this belief is
not found, then we assume that (!( I have been in
the bar)) is true.
2.2 Goals
An IVA has one main goal and one or several sub-
goals. The main goal is the objective that the IVA
is trying to achieve at a certain moment. Without a
goal the agent is lost, aimless, and no plan will be
invoked because there is nothing to fight for. i.e. I
want to drink a beer.
During the process of achieving a goal, an IVA
has to deal with smaller goals on which the out-
come of the larger one relies on, that is what we
call subgoals. i.e. Looking at the previous main
goal’s example, some things are needed to get a
beer, therefore during this goal achievement there
will be subgoals such as go to the bar, ask if they
sell beer, ask for the beer, pay the beer, and finally
drink it.
2.3 Competing plans
An IVA uses a set of competing plans that specify
a sequence of actions to be performed in order to
reach its main goal. A competing plan  is de-
scribed as:
 
	


where:

	 is a list of internal states to be checked be-
fore the plan can be executed. Each of the
internal states has an associated valid value
or range. The Behavioral Engine is in charge
of checking whether the current level of the
agent’s internal state is adequate (within a given
range) for executing the plan. i.e. For Claire
to be able to dance, her tiredness level can not
be too high.



is a list of preconditions which have to
be true before the competing plan can be trig-
gered. The preconditions belong either to the
agent’s beliefs or to the general knowledge
stored in the world.

ﬀ is a list which contains the effects of a plan
execution. When a plan is selected changes
at agent or at world level will occur. These
changes are consequences of the plan’s ef-
fects (See Figure 3)
Internal states
ACTCH
World
Beliefs
ADD
DEL
ADDW
DELW
Virtual Human
Figure 3: Plans’ effects.
ADD used to add new beliefs to the agent,
beliefs that will became true when the plan
is executed. i.e. Claire wants to take a
train, and she has a plan that tells her that
a ticket is a requirement for taking a train,
also one of her beliefs tell her that she
does not have one. The Behavioral En-
gine then activates the plan for going to
the counter in order to get it. At the end
of the plan execution Claire will have the
ticket, and the dynamic beliefs will be ac-
cordingly updated, now the statement I
have the ticket is part of her Short Term
Belief.
DEL used for deleting beliefs that won’t be
true any more after the plan’s execution.
Referring to the previous example, once
Claire gets the ticket, it is not true any
more that she needs one.
ADDW used to add general knowledge. This
is an atomic operation in order to ensure
the system reliability. i.e. Claire sit on
chair number 1, she will update the world
common knowledge by sending Chair1
being used as new general knowledge.
DELW used to delete general knowledge that
is not true any more. This is also an atomic
operation. i.e. When Claire stand up,
she has to delete the general knowledge
Chair1 being used.
ACT used to send an action to be performed
by the virtual humanoid. i.e. Claire wants
to drink a beer and her plans tell her to go
to the bar to get it. In order to execute the
plan successfully an ACT action is gener-
ated Claire goes to bar.
CH reflects some changes in the internal state
of the IVA. i.e. When Claire dances, her
tiredness level increases.
A competing plan is executable at time t when
all of its preconditions are observed to be true and
when all the internal states have the desired levels
in that specific moment. One example of a plan is
showed by Figure 4.
Claire will execute this plan when she arrives at
the bar, if and only if she is a curious agent. To be
a curios agent in this case means that her level of
curiosity is bigger than 50. The plan also checks
if she is at the bar and if she had never being there
before. The conclusion of this plan is to perform
the action Inspect the place which consist of look-
ing around it. Some updates to the Short Term Be-
liefs are also needed: She has being in the bar and
She is inspecting the bar
Each agent has a set of plans available for choos-
ing which is the next action to perform. Some of
       ’((Act (inspect the (? place)))
          (Add (inspecting the (? place)))
          (Add (has been in (? place)))
      *P_Walker*)
         ))
         )         
(RememberPlan
    (newPlan ’inspect-place
       ’((curiosity 50 >))
       ’((is at (? place))
          (! (has been is (? place)))
Figure 4: Plan example.
the plans’ ADD effects are at the same time pre-
conditions of another plans, this generate a light
connection between plans, as showed by Figure 5.
One node of the tree represents a plan. One node
is a father (i.e. node 1) if it has an ADD effect that
at the same time is precondition of another plan, in
this case called son (i.e. node 2 is son of node 1).
The ovals indicate internal values or stimulus and
circles represent external events, which are nec-
essary to trigger the plan. The leaves of the plan
are the actions to be performed by the virtual hu-
manoid.
1
2
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54
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7
A
B
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D
Internal stimulusPlan external events
Actions
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Figure 5: Plans’ structure.
2.4 Internal states
The agent has a set of internal states represent-
ing physiological or psychological variables of the
virtual humanoid, such as level of hunger, fear or
boredom. This internal states acts as a stimulus for
the agent, i.e. a high hunger level will stimulate
the agent to eat. An internal state 	 is described
as a tuple:
	ﬁﬂﬃﬁ !"	ﬃﬁ!"#%$&'(#*)
for any given internal state i:

ﬃ+ is his name, such as hunger, tiredness, sad-
ness and happiness.

!"	ﬃﬁ is his minimum accepted value.

!"#%$& is his maximum accepted value.

' is his current value.

(#*) is his category. (To be explain in section
3.2)
Internal states are constantly being adjusted, as
the simulation evolves and plans are adopted. Changes
in the internal state are consequences of:
 The autonomous growth or damping associ-
ated to the internal state. i.e. The hunger’s
level increases over time in a specific rate if
no food is given.
 The side-effects of an active behavior. i.e.
Eating decreases the level of hunger
Internal states have two different effects in the
plans’ executions:
 Plan Inhibition the internal states are values
that are checked to trigger a plan, some of the
plans are inhibited because some levels of the
internal states are too high or too low. i.e. In
the plan showed before, if Claire is not curi-
ous enough (her curiosity level is lower than
50) the plan will not be triggered.
 Action Intensity Modulation the internal state
influences the strength of the action taken by
the virtual humanoid. i.e. The way Claire
walks depends on her level of happiness, the
higher the happiness the livelier the way she
walks.
2.5 The Behavioral Engine (BE)
The paradigm of action selection is not a recent
topic, and is not only a problem focused by ar-
tificial intelligence researches. Some ethologists
such as Tinbergen [11], suggested that the behav-
ior of an animal should be considered as a result
of competing behaviors, where each one follows a
self-interested goal. In our model the action selec-
tion problem is handled by the IVA’s Behavioral
Engine (BE), who decides which of the compet-
ing plans should control the IVA, as shown in the
Figure 6.
IVA
Perception Action
Plan
internal states
List of 
Internal stateEvent
BeliefBelief
List of events
Engine
Behavioral
Virtual Humaoid
Set of plans
beliefs beliefs
Short termLong term
Figure 6: Behavioral engine.
The Behavioral Engine first checks in the pend-
ing event list for those events that trigger in a spe-
cific time slot. The selected events are integrated
in the IVA’s knowledge, being associated by de-
fault with the short-term beliefs, otherwise if it
is specified it goes to the long term beliefs. i.e.
When triggering the event Music turned on, the
agent will update his short term belief Music on.
The BE also checks the perception of the environ-
ment to see if this coincide with his beliefs state
and makes the necessary updates.
Then the BE chooses the suitable plan for that
specific time slot, based on the interplay of IVA’s
internal and external factors. Each plan has some
pre-conditions, some of these concerns about the
IVA’s beliefs, others concern about the general knowl-
edge stored in the world agent. Also the levels
of the internal states has to be suitable to be able
to perform a plan, where suitability is defined as
having the minimum level specified in the plan’s
requirements, as mention before.
The BE should go through the agent’s plans hi-
erarchy, finding the plan to be executed. More
than one plan can be trigger in a given moment,
but only one action can take place. i.e. Plan A,
B and C are trigger in time ) , and plan A and C
has an ACT effect. By default, first checked plan
is first to be executed, in this case is plan A and an
action #ﬀ is started. Then plan B is also triggered,
in this case there is no action to be performed, just
internal updates, so the plan is accepted and also
executed. But when the BE tries to trigger plan C,
this is not executed because it has an ACT effect,
and there is already one action being performed.
Then the BE store the action of plan C as a pend-
ing action.
Some authors like McFarlands [6], pointed out
the importance of the interplay between internal
and external factors: plans should guide to goal
achievement based on the state and knowledge of
the agent, but also taking advantage of opportunis-
tic situations in the world. This characteristic is
also reflected in our model, because the BE is able
to ask for environment’s data at any moment. If
the Behavioral Engine notice that one of the pre-
conditions is not fulfilled by the agents beliefs, he
will check in the environment data 1. i.e. If Claire
wants to take chair number1, one precondition for
this is : Chair1 free. Claire does not have this
information, therefore her BE looks up the world
knowledge if Chair1 free exist. If it exist the plans
will be trigger.
The BE is also in charge of updating the dy-
namic beliefs and the internal states of the IVA,
and updating the world general knowledge.
3 Trusting agents
Many psychologist have studied how humans use
trust in every days life, but almost no author in Ar-
tificial Life has mention it. We think that to be
able to simulate believable intelligent virtual hu-
manoids we need to implement as close as pos-
sible the humans’ behaviors, and trust can not be
excluded.
Before going any further lets assume the defi-
nition of trust given by R. Swinth[10]: ”Choose
to take an ambiguous path that can lead to a ben-
eficial event or a harmful event depending on the
,
To be explained later in this paper
behavior of the other person - where the harmful
event is more punishing than the beneficial event
is rewarding”.
In our model each IVA is autonomous, and he
can accept or reject an order coming from the user
or from another agent. Each IVA has a set of Be-
liefs about others in which he stores the trust levels
associated with them (See Figure 1). An IVA sees
the user as another agent, and depending on the
user’s category he will accept the order or not. The
levels of trust will evolve during the simulation,
but before explaining how does it works lets dis-
cuss a little about human trust. Some researches
in psychology had shown that: ”Trust, once estab-
lished in some degree, is often self-reinforcing be-
cause individuals have stronger tendencies to con-
firm their prior beliefs than to disprove them” [4].
This characteristic can be explained through a hys-
teresis curve as shown in Figure 7. Lets imagine a
human A who does not trust in B. At the beginning
it is very difficult to convince him to trust in B, B
must do a lot of effort to make A start trusting in
him a little bit. When this happen, agent A will be
dramatically easy change his opinion to start trust-
ing in B. Once the level of trust is very high, it gets
stuck a little bit and little progress can be see. The
same idea is applied to stop trusting in somebody,
once agent A trust in B deeply, it is very difficult
to make him to change his opinion, but after some
small steps, the trust level will drop dramatically,
and then just small changes can be noticed.
Average
Untrusting
Trusting
Acceptance
Trust
Figure 7: Trusting curve.
To be able to show this behavior we have cho-
sen some categories, from the lowest trusting level
to the highest trusting levels: 0-Low, Low, Low-
Medium, Medium, Medium-High, High, High-Blind,
Blindly.
All IVAS storage the name of the other agent
and the level of trust associated to it. The value of
acceptance for any order coming from a user with
certain trusting level can be seen from Figure8, in
which the higher the trust level, the higher the pos-
sibility of accepting the order, and the lower the
trust level, the lower the possibility of accepting
it. These values of trust are not fixed and they will
evolve during the simulation, as we will explain
later in this section.
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Figure 8: Levels of acceptance.
If the IVA does not have an entry a specific user
in his Beliefs about others, then a new entry is cre-
ated with a default value: Medium Level.
3.1 Controlling the agent at two levels
The user can interact with the IVA through a graph-
ical user interface where he can send some orders
to the agent. The user has two types of command
that can be sent to any IVA:
Beliefs the user wants the agent to start believing
something. For example, the user want that
the agent A believes that ”It is raining”, on
other words the user wants that:
(BEL A (It is raining))2
This type of command is intended to be used
as collaboration paradigm, the user want to
help the agent to succeed with his goal. i.e.
.
Following the Cohen-Levesque multi-modal logic.
Claire is lost in the virtual world, she is look-
ing for tickets and she doesn’t know where
they can be found, and neither the world’s
common knowledge has that information3 The
user can pass this information at real time through
the graphical user interface, tickets are found
at counter. If Claire accept the belief which is
sent, maybe her behavioral engine will trigger
some new plans which will solve the situation
of finding a ticket.
Orders the user want that the agent perform an
action directly. For example the user want the
agent A to dance, in our syntax:
/103245ﬀ687:9;8<
This type of command is sent to control the
agent, instead of trying to cooperate with him,
we want the agent to do something.
When the IVA receives one of these commands,
the behavioral engine selects the sender and checks
in the set of beliefs about other the trusting level
of that user, who is seen as another agent. Then
the behavioral engine applies the adequate accep-
tance probability to accept or reject this command.
But what does it mean to accept a command? For
a belief this means to be added to the agent’s be-
liefs, and for an action it means that the agent will
perform it in the next slot of time if he is not do-
ing anything at the moment, or when he finish the
current action.
3.2 Categorizing the internal states
To be able to implement the dynamic changes on
the trusting levels, we categorize the internal states,
because these are the based of this trusting model.
The IVAs will update the values of the trust based
on dramatic changes in his internal state levels.
We wont make any concrete definition of what
an emotion means, because this is a topic that still
been discuss by psychologist, neither we want to
explain the difference between moods, feelings,
passions, needs, or sensibilities, because this is not
clearly distinguished and it is not our goal to do it
so.=
The world agent and all the common knowledge will be explained in the next
section.
We categorize the internal states as ascendants
and descendants, for example, happiness is ascen-
dant, the higher the level the better for the IVA,
and hunger is descendant, the lower the level the
better. Some internal state won’t be categorized as
curiosity, because we can not say that a high cu-
riosity level is good or not.
Looking at some internal state we can catego-
rize them as shown in Figure 9.
Curiosity
Love
Emotion
Boredom Excitement
Category
ASC
DSC
ASC
DSC
Enthusiasm
Impatience
CategoryEmotion
Figure 9: Categorazing the internal states.
3.3 Changing the trust levels
When the IVAs accepts a command coming from
the user, the first action that the behavioral engine
performs is to check which plans are triggered, and
the influence that they have in the internal state. If
there are changes bigger than the >@?BA of the max-
imum level of the internal state, then, the agent
pass to analyses the category of the internal state.
 For an increment bigger than the >@?&A in as-
cendant internal state, the trust level of the
user will increase by one category, because
this means that what the agent accept makes
him feel better, and he can trust more in that
user.
 For an increment bigger than the >@?&A in de-
scendant internal state, the trust level of the
user will decrease by one category, because
this means that what the agent accept makes
him feel worse, and he will trust less in the
user next time.
 Increments or decrements in non-categorized
internal state does not count.
4 The Intelligent Module
The IVAs are not isolated in our system, they are
one active element of an intelligent module we
have called IntelMod. The IntelMod is composed
of five components: Events’ interface, Dispatcher
Module, World Agent, IVA’s Families and the In-
telligent Virtual Agent already presented (See Fig-
ure 10).
Events’ Interface
Dispatcher module
Agent’s
families
List of events
... World
Def1: Train 787 will 
From the environment
arrive at gate 6 at 7pm
At time 10 agent1
needs to take the train
Preprogramed GUI
Intelligent virtual
Agent n
From the user at real time
Intelligent virtual
Agent 1
Figure 10: IntelMod.
4.1 Events’ Interface
The events’ interface is in charge of passing the
events sent by the user to the dispatcher module
who will decide their final destination.
In order to interact with the IVA, and eventually
animate the virtual humanoid, we have defined an
event framework. Events are sent to the intelligent
virtual agents and the world. An event CD has the
following structure:
CDﬁﬂﬃE#%!"F(G@ﬃ+)8ﬃ+))8#%HJI@)

)8	!"KLHM	I@I@ﬀH

	Nﬁ
An event CD is delivered to the IVA specified by
)8#*HMI@)

in a given time slot )O	!PKLHM	I@I@H

, then
the IVA is in charge of manipulating the data con-
tained in (G@ﬃ+)8ﬃ+)Q . The events come from three
different sources:
The environment’s definition the events coming
from the environment’s definition belong to a
specific world, and they must be specified in
advanced by the programmer. (e.g. The rock
music in the bar is turned on at 10pm).
User’s pre-programmed file , the user can define,
prior to the simulation, some events to be trig-
gered at a specific time during the simulation.
(e.g. The goal of Claire is to have fun). In
opposition to the events coming from the en-
vironment definition, these events belong to
the agents, rather than to the world, but they
are treated equally in the simulation.
Graphical user interface , during the simulation,
the user is offered the possibility to specify
agent’s goals in real time, to define new events
that could change the development of the sim-
ulation, or send orders to the agents.
4.2 Dispatcher Module
Once an event has been retrieved from the spe-
cific source, the events’ interface passes the list of
events to the dispatcher module which is in charge
of delivering the event to the concerned agent, as
shown in Figure 10. Events can have three differ-
ent kinds of targets:
A specific IVA in this case the dispatcher module
uses the target name to find the corresponding
agent.
All IVAs these messages are delivered by the dis-
patcher module to all IVAs available, like a
broadcast message.
World agent in this case the message concerns only
to the world, and the message is passed to it.
4.3 World Agent
When the IntelMod starts running, it does not have
any information about the system, and ignores ev-
erything about the environment, the distribution,
the position and orientation of the agents and the
objects’ position.
An instance of a world agent must be already
active for an IVA to be able to load and start inter-
acting with the associated virtual humanoid. The
world agent manages the general information of
the environment, stores the names and the IDs of
all active humanoids in the virtual environment.
Also each IVA has a reference to the IVA’s world
which it belongs to, in order to be able to access
information about others through it.
The first world agent’s action is to connect to
the system to get the number of virtual humanoids
available in the virtual world and their respective
names and IDs. When the world agent has this
information, the intelligent agents are able to con-
nect and to start interacting with the virtual hu-
manoids.
The world agent stores common and relevant
information for all IVA’s. It is organized in two
different groups:
Static Common Knowledge where resides all the
unchangeable world’s information. (e.g. Cold
drinks are found in the bar of the LIG’s Lounge.)
This knowledge is loaded into the world at the
beginning of the simulation, and only addi-
tions are allowed at run-time.
Dynamic Common Knowledge where all the dy-
namic world’s information resides. This in-
formation can be changed dynamically dur-
ing the development of the simulation. (e.g
. In a specific moment, the music is off in
the LIG’s Lounge). But later in the simula-
tion, there will be an event that tells the world
agent that the music is turned on.
An example of the world specification is showed
in Figure 11.
empty-list)))
((name ’LIG’s_Lounge
)
(agentsList ’(Claire))
(staticCommonKnowledge
(dynamicCommonKnowledge
((chair_2 is free bar-chair)
’((drink is found at bar-place)
((dancing can be done at dancing-area)
((relax can be done at chair)
((time is found at watch)
empty-list)))))
’((chair_1 is free bar-chair)
Figure 11: World specification.
4.4 IVA’s Families
A society role is described by a set of skills, which
the agent needs to have in order to fulfil its role
requirements. This skills are gruped and speci-
fied inside the IVA’s families. i.e. client role and
waitress role in a bar. All agents belong to one
or several agent families. Two agents belonging
to the same family have the same abilities (equal
Figure 12: LIG’s Lounge’s simulation.
set of plans) but their beliefs and emotional states
are different at any given moment. e.g. In a vir-
tual LIG’s Lounge we can find clients and waitress
(Figure 12). All clients are in the LIG’s Lounge
for the same reason: they would like to have a
nice time, but they behave differently because they
have different internal states, different beliefs and
different assumptions about others. The clients’
family has all the plans that allow an IVA to take a
drink, take a chair, dance or just meet some people.
Waitress does not care about dancing or having
fun, they are just working and serving the clients,
therefore the waitress’ family has another set of
plans. A client does not know how to serve some-
one, unless we create a client-waitress’ family.
When the user wants to instantiate an IVA, one
of the available IVA’s families is picked up, and a
message is sent to the world agent in order to ob-
tain the control of a virtual humanoid. Once the
IVA has the name and the ID of the virtual hu-
manoid, it creates a socket using this name, and
starts the bi-directional communication between
the virtual humanoid and the IVA.
5 A real example
As we have been mention in this paper, we have
developed a simulation of an LIG’s Lounge, where
the agent can go to have a drink, talk, listen mu-
sic and dance. In our case we put a client agent
called Claire. Claire went to the bar because she
wanted to dance and drink something, and because
this can be found at a bar. When she arrives she in-
spects the place because she has never been there
before. Then she decides to stay. She is not tired
enough, therefore she decided not to sit, but she
goes to the serving bar looking for something to
drink (See Figure 12a). Nothing is happening...
then she starts getting bored (See Figure 12b). A
music on event occurs, and she goes to dance(See
Figure 12c). Then another event occurs music off.
She stops dancing and she decides now to sit. Her
temperature is high, then she sweats, and she hates
this, then she cleans her face and takes a seat. She
is attracted by a poster, she goes to see it, and then
sit again. Her boredom level has increased a lot,
reason why she just leaves the bar.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we presented some key points for
simulating human-like virtual actors. We presented
the action selection paradigm as a process com-
pound of: goal achievement planning, dynamic
beliefs management, evolving goals, internal states
and confidence levels. We also presented a new
approach to control virtual humanoids, based on
Human Trust theories, where the agent is com-
pletely autonomous of accepting or rejecting an
order.
Enhancements to be done include improving the
memory model, the management of unsolved sit-
uations due to lack of suitable plans to apply in
that specific moment. The trust model will be ap-
plied in virtual humanoids direct communication
and collaboration. Our future work will focus on
these problems and we will deal with the imple-
mentation of verbal communication to be able to
add cooperation, and collaborative group behav-
iors to the virtual environments.
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